

CCR  
HDO CRITICAL ITEM LIST

09/11/90 APPROVED 01/02/90

AMM/ETI

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NAME R/N CAT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
WILL PREVENT CAGE, 2/10 ITEM 391 09201700-5   103	Failure External gas leakage.	END ITEM: Cage gas leakage to ambient.	A. Design - The will has two leakage paths, one through an Intel face type O-ring and the other through Bourdon tube soldered joint. The seal is elastomeric material.
	CAUSE: Tool failure, Leakage in the Bourdon tube.	END INTEGRATE: Excessive consumption of the primary oxygen supply. The IOP is automatically activated during IOP if the tool pressure drops to 3.30 psia.  MISSION: Termination EVA. Loss of use of one IOP.	A non-acid base flux is used on the Bourdon tube Intel Joint, and the tube end is welded closed without using flux. The Bourdon tube is not highly stressed at proof pressure and the oxygen/temperature environment is not severe.
		EMERGENCY: Time for single failure. Possible loss of crewman with loss of SOP.	B. Test - Acceptance Test (Graves, Inc.): A leakage test is performed by pressurizing the item to 5.5 psid with helium. A leak detector "Nullifer" is used to determine that the unit leakage does exceed 2000-5 acm/sec.  DRA: An external leakage test is performed per SRSU-50-015, the pressure goes to pressurized to 4.2-4.5 psid with oxygen. Leakage is measured for a 10 minute minimum test period and must not exceed 20 acm/hr.

Certification:  
The item completed the 15 year structural vibration and  
shock certification testing during 10/85. The item  
completed 4,300 cycles during 3/85 which fulfill the cycle  
certification requirement of 4,392. Engineering changes  
42844-368 (revised Pressure Gauge Calibration Requirements) &  
42844-369 (modified Test Gauge Accuracy) have been  
incorporated & certified by analysis/similarity since this  
configuration was tested.

D. Inspection -  
Tool failure. O-ring grooves are 100% inspected per drawing  
dimensions and surface finish.

O-rings are inspected for surface characteristics per SRSU  
3122; 100% for class I & II, and at least 1.5 ARI for class  
III.

Leakage in the Bourdon tube. The vendor acceptance test for  
leakage will detect a failure of this nature.

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EMU RECENT FAILURES

ITEM	DESCRIPTION	FAILURE EFFECT	RECOMMEND FOR ACCORDANCE
1	Failure		
2	Failure		
3	Failure		

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E. Failure History -

EMU-311-4601 (12/10/88) - Fracture in bunion tube due to corrosion resulting from the contamination. Incorporated improved post-hold-down cleaning procedures and eliminated film from the end closure jacket.

EMU-301-4001 (3/19/88) - the O-ring between the base plate and fixture plating. O-ring was revised in this location and uses detailed cross-section of the gage.

F. Ground Intervention -

Tested per EMU C-001, Sec Structure and Leaks.

G. Operational Use -

Crew Response -

Prohibit troubleshoot problem. If no success, disconnection of EMU, consider third EMU if available. EMU than EMU data continue an accelerated step to primary EMU and processes, correlate EMU.

Special Training - Standard EMU training covers this failure mode.

Operational Considerations - EMU checklist procedure verify hardware integrity and system operational status prior to EMU. Flight rules dictate some go-arounds related to EMU pressure integrity and regulation, best EMU data system allows ground monitoring of the system.

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